

# Nuclear Security Programme Management

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The WINS Academy Elective on Nuclear Security Programme Management has been developed primarily for senior managers who, as functional specialists, are responsible for implementing their organisations' nuclear security arrangements.

The module outlines how managing a nuclear security programme effectively is a complex and challenging task—not least because the range of potential threats is becoming more complex every year and the cost of security continues to rise. Furthermore, leaders in some nuclear organisations still view security as a non-productive and expensive regulatory overhead expense. In such circumstances, security management is at a stage of development similar to where safety management was a few decades ago: perceived as interfering with production, operations, commissioning and design.

The module also discusses why nuclear security management has lagged behind nuclear safety management. In the wake of a few serious nuclear accidents, attitudes toward safety management began to change; today, the nuclear sector seeks excellence in all aspects of safety and operation. National and international industry organisations conduct independent, wide-ranging peer reviews of safety arrangements and readily share best practices. Boards of directors appoint subcommittees to oversee safety performance in their own organisations, and the regulatory framework for nuclear safety management is extensive and highly developed. Some countries and organisations approach nuclear security management in a similar way, but many other countries and organisations do not. Furthermore, divisions often remain between safety and security management.


Another reason that nuclear security management has lagged behind nuclear safety management is that security is generally a shared responsibility between the State and the licensee. This means that the licensee is likely to have a large number of external interfaces with government-related organisations responsible for national security, including policing and law enforcement, intelligence assessment and dissemination, and regulation of nuclear facilities and transport operations. Each interface is a potential source of confusion over roles and responsibilities. In the absence of significant incidents or comprehensive security exercises, gaps in capability and procedures can develop quickly.

Furthermore, the absence of significant incidents makes it challenging to motivate security personnel and to persuade other members of the senior management team that the threats are real and must be taken seriously to prevent real harm and reputational damage. The threat no longer comes solely from armed outside assailants seeking to cause physical damage; it also comes from those who exploit vulnerabilities in IT & IC systems and from insiders who act maliciously, either alone or in league with external attackers. In addition, the growth in mobile communications technology and 24-hour media coverage can quickly transform a relatively benign security incident into a full-blown crisis.

By the end of the module, participants will understand how to:

- Establish and implement a comprehensive nuclear security programme to address threats and interfaces—and to do it in a way that gains organisational support.
- Address security management challenges and objectives at their organisation and how they can be improved. Being technically competent is essential, but unless participants can promote security to the wider managerial team their efforts may be in vain.





## OUTLINE

### UNIT 1: IMPLEMENTING AN EFFECTIVE NUCLEAR SECURITY PROGRAMME

- 1.1 Responsibilities and Risk Assessment
- 1.2 The Components of a Nuclear Security Programme
- 1.3 Strategy Mapping
- 1.4 Overcoming Challenges to the Security Strategy

### UNIT 2: WHAT MAKES AN EFFECTIVE SECURITY DIRECTOR?

- 2.1 The Security Director Position
- 2.2 Success Criteria for Nuclear Security Directors
- 2.3 Professional Development and Assessment

### UNIT 3: MANAGING RELATIONSHIPS: EXTERNAL STAKEHOLDERS

- 3.1 The State and the Nuclear Security Regulator
- 3.2 Communicating about Security Events
- 3.3 Working with Outside Communities
- 3.4 Civil Society Engagement

### UNIT 4: MANAGING RELATIONSHIPS: INTERNAL STAKEHOLDERS

- 4.1 Executive Decision Making
- 4.2 The RACI Technique
- 4.3 Management Issues
- 4.4 Conducting Employee Attitude Surveys on Security
- 4.5 Developing Employee Discussion and Focus Groups
- 4.6 Implementing Systematic Training, Evaluation and Communications
- 4.7 Creating Effective Internal Policies and Procedures

### UNIT 5: MANAGING RELATIONSHIPS: THE SECURITY TEAM

- 5.1 Styles of Leadership and Management
- 5.2 Team Recruitment and Motivation

### UNIT 6: PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT, EXERCISING AND REPORTING

- 6.1 Understanding and Managing Security Expenditure
- 6.2 Performance Exercises
- 6.3 Performance Reports