



World Institute for
Nuclear Security

THE SECURITY OF RADIOACTIVE SOURCES

THE ROAD TO SUSTAINABILITY AND RESILIENCE

Pierre Legoux, WINS

Stockholm, Sweden. 23 January 2018

Some Context



- ❑ The IAEA, the Code of Conduct and the 2018 Conference
- ❑ The Nuclear Security Summit process and the gift baskets
- ❑ WINS and its programme of work



WINS Vision and Mission

All nuclear and other radiological materials and facilities are effectively secured by demonstrably competent professionals applying best practice to achieve operational excellence

To be the leader in knowledge exchange, professional development and certification for nuclear security management



WINS Vision and Mission

All nuclear and other radiological materials and facilities are effectively secured by demonstrably competent professionals applying best practice to achieve operational excellence

To be the leader in knowledge exchange, professional development and certification for nuclear security management

WINS Suite of Services



Sharing Operational Experience



Knowledge Centre



Training & Certification



Evaluation

WINS Achievements

80+

International
Best Practice
Workshops



30+

International
Best Practice
Guides




10

Nuclear Security
Management
Certification
Modules



WINS Website



- All publications
- Workshop presentations and reports
- Networking (Alumni)

Objectives of the workshop

- Share experience and lessons learned
- Recognize success – identify gaps – discuss possible solutions
- Suggest actions at all levels
- Encourage a pro-active attitude, benchmarking, and increased reporting and transparency.
- Prepare for the CoC meetings and the IAEA 2018 conference
- Review INF/CIRC 910 and discuss options/incentives to encourage more countries to sign up
- Identify where we want to be in 3 to 5 years
- Others?

Agenda

- ❑ Introduction
- ❑ Strengthening the international framework for the security of radioactive sources
- ❑ Developing a robust national regime: experiences and lessons learned by regulators
- ❑ Implementing security measures: experiences and lessons learned by end users
- ❑ Other options to address the risk
- ❑ Way forward
- ❑ Conclusion





PRE-WORKSHOP SURVEY

Survey – International cooperation




- ❑ 84% are familiar with the international regime for the security of sources
- ❑ 47% are satisfied with the level of cooperation and coordination at the international level (33% do not know)
- ❑ 53% believe that The frequency of Code of Conduct meetings is sufficient to ensure effective exchange of experiences and to maintain the momentum internationally (43% do not know)

Survey – INFCIRC/910

I believe that the INFCIRC 910 is comprehensive and covers all necessary aspects of the security of sources.





Strongly agree		0%
Agree		50%
Disagree		16%
Strongly Disagree		7%
I do not know		27%

I would encourage non-signatory countries to become part of INFCIRC 910.






Strongly agree		30%
Agree		53%
Disagree		0%
Strongly Disagree		0%
I do not know		17%

Survey – The national regime and the effectiveness of the security measures




In my country, the regulatory regime for the security of sources is mature and effective

Strongly agree		43%
Agree		33%
Disagree		20%
Strongly Disagree		4%

I am confident that arrangements in place in my country for the security of sources are adequate and sufficient.

Strongly agree		30%
Agree		43%
Disagree		17%
Strongly Disagree		3%
I do not know		7%

Survey – Consistency over the life cycle

In my opinion the security of sources is consistent all over their life cycle			
Yes			30%
No			37%
I do not know			33%






What areas would require more attention:

- Transport. Huge variation in security provision world-wide . More consistency required.
- Exchanges between cycle stages
- Disused sources. Interim storage or disposal stage.
- End users weak point compared to manufacturers




*64% believe that enough security attention is provided to category 4 and 5 radioactive sources.

Survey – Response arrangements and flexibility of the security programme

In my opinion, law enforcement agencies are sufficiently engaged in the process of protecting radioactive sources.






Strongly agree		13%
Agree		27%
Disagree		37%
Strongly Disagree		7%
I do not know		16%

I believe that the security arrangements currently in place are flexible enough to adapt to evolutions in the threat.




Strongly agree		0%
Agree		43%
Disagree		20%
Strongly Disagree		0%
I do not know		37%

Survey – Response arrangements and flexibility of the security programme

In my opinion, law enforcement agencies are sufficiently engaged in the process of protecting radioactive sources.

Strongly agree		13%
Agree		27%
Disagree		37%
Strongly Disagree		7%
I do not know		16%

I believe that the security arrangements currently in place are flexible enough to adapt to evolutions in the threat.

Strongly agree		0%
Agree		43%
Disagree		20%
Strongly Disagree		0%
I do not know		37%





Survey – Competencies

I believe that individuals involved in the management of sources have the necessary understanding and competences to perform their security related responsibilities.


Strongly agree		0%
Agree		53%
Disagree		43%
Strongly Disagree		4%

Survey – Alternative Technologies

I believe that alternative technologies are an appropriate way to reduce the radiological risk.

Strongly agree		13%
Agree		47%
Disagree		17%
Strongly Disagree		0%
I do not know		23%

I believe that more incentives should be provided to support the adoption of alternative technologies.

Strongly agree		13%
Agree		37%
Disagree		17%
Strongly Disagree		0%
I do not know		33%

Survey – Remaining challenges (extract)

- Convincing all stakeholders, in particular end users, of the importance of radioactive source security.
- Assess the threat and adapt to its evolutions
- Integrate safety and security provisions
- Security awareness and culture, especially at small users
- Coordinate multiple competent authorities
- Harmonisation of practices amongst countries

Survey - Participants Expectations (Extract)

- Share experience and lessons learned
- Meet and network.
- Deepen knowledge.
- Be aware of "the international state of the art " about security of radioactive sources
- Learn from from people who faced with similar challenges.
- Learn new approaches. Be more familiar with decision making.
- Identify good practices.
- Understand how to deal with deficiencies.

Workshop process

- ❑ PRESENTATIONS
- ❑ MODERATED PLENARY DISCUSSIONS
- ❑ TABLE DISCUSSIONS
- ❑ BREAK OUT GROUPS
- ❑ EXPERT PANELS
- ❑ E-VOTING

Workshop process

- ❑ LEARN, SHARE, CONTRIBUTE
- ❑ MEET & NETWORK
- ❑ ENJOY YOUR TIME



IDEAS
into
A.C.T.I.O.N

- ❑ SECURITY IS IMPROVED!
 - ONE ACTION FOR YOURSELF
 - ONE SUGGESTION FOR YOUR ORGANISATION



World Institute for
Nuclear Security

THE SECURITY OF RADIOACTIVE SOURCES – THE ROAD TO SUSTAINABILITY AND RESILIENCE

**Pierre Legoux, Head of Programmes
Stockholm, Sweden. 23 January 2018**