

MOTIVATING STAFF WITH ACCOUNTABILITY FOR NUCLEAR SECURITY

ROUND TABLE REPORT – Draft for comments

11–12 DECEMBER 2018



BACKGROUND

Engaging with employees begins when they are recruited and receive their first security induction training. It continues as they regularly receive refresher training on the basics and specialised training to meet their changing job responsibilities. One of the most important objectives of a security programme is to establish a competency-based structure throughout the organisation that defines the knowledge, skills and behaviours employees need to carry out their security responsibilities effectively and efficiently.

Because nuclear security is an essential function of all nuclear organisations, one of leadership's goals should be to develop a strong, robust security culture among the entire staff. Leadership who demonstrate commitment to security and managers who lead by example to proactively motivate the workforce play an essential role in achieving a resilient nuclear security culture.

Motivation is the key determinant of human behaviour. Because it depends upon the internalisation of beliefs and values, many employees in the nuclear industry will ignore or attempt to circumvent security best practices until they truly believe it is the right thing to do, thereby increasing the likelihood of lapses in security. Both personal and group motivational systems are important in improving the effectiveness of nuclear security.

With this in mind, WINS organised an International Round Table on *Motivating Staff with Accountability for Nuclear Security* from 11 to 12 December 2018 in Vienna that was attended by 12 international experts. WINS also used this opportunity to discuss and review a

security culture training package we are developing that gives managers in the nuclear security field specific tools they can use to improve their staff's attitudes and behaviours toward security. (The document is available to attendees of the event.)

ROUND TABLE STRUCTURE

The round table was structured into five main sessions, and a wide variety of speakers provided their perspectives on motivating staff with accountability for nuclear security.

OPENING SESSION

The opening session, which was led by WINS Head of Programmes, Mr. Pierre Legoux, provided an overview of the topic and the benefits that could be achieved by improving staff motivation toward security. He also explained that the round table had seven major objectives:

- To better understand what motivation is and how it may influence the implementation of security
- To brainstorm on what *ideal motivation* looks like
- To listen to first-hand experiences in motivating staff
- To review positive and negative factors that influence motivation
- To discuss the role that motivation plays in establishing a good security culture
- To listen to and learn from other experiences (e.g. nuclear safety)
- To support the development of training materials that increase employee motivation towards security

Mr. Legoux also shared the results of the pre-roundtable survey, which indicated that almost 70% of the participants thought employees comply with security procedures because they are instructed to do so rather than because they truly believe it is the right thing to do.

PARTICIPANT INTRODUCTIONS AND EXPECTATIONS

The round table speaker and moderator, **Mr Carsten Speicher**, continued the opening session by asking participants to introduce themselves and share their expectations about the round table. Remarks included to:

- Learn best practices for motivating staff;
- Learn how other environments and industries motivate their staffs in regard to security;
- Better understand education and training needs in this field, from both the regulatory and operator perspectives;
- Learn from others about what has and has not worked;
- Benchmark and network;
- Work with likeminded individuals to help WINS move forward in this area;
- Gain a wider understanding of motivation in the context of nuclear security.

SESSION 1: WHAT IS MOTIVATION AND HOW DOES IT RELATE TO EFFECTIVE SECURITY PERFORMANCE?

This session was designed to provide an overview of what motivation is and the differences between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. The session also explored the characteristics and driving factors for workforce motivation.

Dr Mario Martínez-Córcoles, University of Valladolid (Spain), delivered the first presentation, which was titled *An Overall Introduction to Workforce Motivation*. He defined motivation as an inner force that accounts for an individual's intensity and persistence of effort toward attaining a goal. He explained the two different types of motivation and pointed out that they are a multidimensional phenomenon. He also explained that motivation should be tailored to each individual to be more effective. In addition, he said that intrinsic motivation gives individuals the ability to maintain higher levels of motivation over time (i.e. persistence). He also said that competence, autonomy and relatedness are important aspects for intrinsic motivation and that leadership is one of the keys to enhancing it, but other aspects should also be considered.

Before the group discussion, Mr Speicher clarified the difference between security and security culture so everyone had the same approach when addressing these concepts and motivation.

The discussions that followed highlighted that although intrinsic motivation is important for maintaining a high level of motivation over time, extrinsic motivation also plays a key role as an initial boost for the employee. Therefore, both types of motivation are needed for the individual. Participants mentioned that money could only sustain performance in the short-term but that organisations tend to focus more on extrinsic motivation rather than intrinsic.

Another factor that was mentioned is that the current digital era in which we live has led to a shift in personal relationships at work, making them less personal and more dehumanised. Because they feel less engaged with the organisation, staff find it more difficult to work with each other in a united way.

The discussion that emerged from this presentation focused predominantly around the benefits, risks and obstacles of motivation. In regard to benefits, participants said that a motivated workforce:

- Enhances and opens communication
- Improves value, respect and trust among organisations
- Fights complacency
- Contributes to stability
- Motivates the workforce to make improvements
- Lowers staff turnover
- Improves finances
- Improves processes and procedures
- Enhances cooperation among staff

Participants also identified some risks when motivation is lacking:

- Leads to a disgruntled workforce
- May cause a higher number of incidents
- Leads to unawareness
- Can cause reputational damage at a corporate level
- Increases the workload
- Increases the threat
- Leads to over-inspection
- Cause a lack of transparency

Finally, participants said that the following obstacles could hamper workforce motivation:

- A highly regulated industry with a lot of procedures
- The financial situation, such as low budgets
- Poorly managed transition periods
- Staff who have different backgrounds, beliefs and values
- Over-inspection
- Poor management training skills and behaviours
- Inappropriate use of technology

SESSION 2: PRACTICAL EXPERIENCES IN MOTIVATING A TEAM. SUCCESS AND CHALLENGES.

This session explored how to motivate and incentivise employees, reviewed the role of different stakeholders in enhancing staff motivation, identified typical challenges and discussed possible solutions to overcome them from the perspective of different professional backgrounds.

FIRST PART OF SESSION 2

In the first presentation, **Mr Norman Bird**, National Nuclear Laboratory NNL (United Kingdom), provided a nuclear security perspective. He explained the difference between what good and bad nuclear security looks like, discussed the special challenges inherent in it—including the people themselves—and said that motivation must bring everything tightly together. Mr Bird also explained the Edgar Schein Theory, which divides organisational culture into three levels: *artifacts*, *espoused values* and *basic underlying assumptions*. He then gave examples from his professional experience, explaining that every organisation has a particular bias, or inclination, towards a particular characteristic or type of behaviour that fundamentally influences motivation. He also presented the *Iceberg Model of Workplace Dynamics*, which describes workplace dynamics and organisational culture, and linked it to his professional experience.

In addition, Mr Bird discussed the impact that questionnaires have on staff motivation and the information that can be extracted from the response rate. He cautioned that conducting a survey is not doing safety or security culture. Organisations need to demonstrate they are taking actions after the survey and monitor the actions and their impact. Finally, he discussed what can be done to improve motivation and emphasised the importance of good leadership through clear communication, optimal use of assets, encouraging appropriate practices and supporting inclusion.

Follow-up Discussion

The discussion that followed helped participants clearly understand what the characteristic of a highly and poorly motivated workforce are from an idealist point of view based on the experiences shared by Mr Bird. In regard to a poorly motivated workforce, participants identified several characteristics and symptoms:

- Apathy and isolation; inward looking
- Negative feelings and complaining
- Unawareness and passivity
- Distrust of management
- Complacency, along with higher latent failure rates (suppression of information); high event rates; and less attention paid to detail
- Burnout of managers
- Reluctance to speak up
- Poor response to regulations

On the other hand, a highly motivated workforce has the following symptoms:

- A desire for continuous improvement
- Being proactive and facing challenges in a positive way
- Fully alignment with values
- Trust, respect and pride
- Full engagement with the organisation
- High levels of vigilance
- A no-blame culture and near to zero failure culture
- Ownership
- Strong support for the organisation and management
- On-going self-assessment
- Low turnover and absenteeism rates

SECOND PART OF SESSION 2

Two more presentations followed in session 2 and focused on practical experiences in motivating a team. **Mr. Patrick Irving**, Canadian Nuclear Laboratories CNL (Canada), provided an STE (scientists, technicians and engineers) perspective, whereas **Mr. C. Russel Clark**, IB3 Solutions (USA), provided a safety perspective.

Mr. Irving explained the three levels of security that exist at CNL and that are approved by the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC). He also shared some of the tools and techniques that CNL uses to enhance motivation toward nuclear security. These include:

- Annual Security Awareness Week
- Monthly security awareness meeting on operating experience
- Security postings on internal website bulletins to raise awareness about security
- Security awareness sessions with employees to teach them what to do in a security emergency

In addition, Mr Irving identified four major components of motivation: job satisfaction, staff engagement, job fulfilment and pride in job. He said CNL has been successful at motivating staff due to their daily interactions with the security group and to

encouraging discussions between different groups before new processes are implemented. He added that CNL still has room for improvement, especially in terms of processing times (personnel and equipment).

Mr Clark then provided the final presentation, emphasising the importance of leadership, management and effective processes and culture. He also said that three things are especially important when it comes to leadership: communication, communication and communication. He then described four steps that his organisation, Yankee Nuclear Power Plant, has taken to ensure all staff are aligned:

- Establish clear goals, policies, strategies, plans and objectives. This promotes alignment at all levels of the organisation and ensure that security is integrated into everyday operations.
- Verify requirements—including those for security—through periodic assessment and review.
- Create better awareness of requirements by ensuring that all departments include security initiatives in their core and implementing documents.
- View security as a critical part of plant training.

Mr Clark also shared some lessons learned:

- There is often a lag between the time weaknesses develop and an event/issue with significant security consequences becomes apparent.
- Weaknesses in leadership, management systems, organisations and processes tend to interact synergistically, creating an unstable situation that exposes the organisation to incidents.
- By identifying early-warning signs through regular assessment, corrective actions can be taken in time to prevent or mitigate potential incidents and improvements can be made to successfully strengthen an organisation's security.

Follow-up Discussion

Following the two presentations, participants briefly discussed the positive and negative factors that impact motivation and shared experiences, behaviours and processes in the workplace that help maintain or reduce motivation. Some of the positive factors mentioned were:

- Find ways to actively engage staff participation.
- Provide sufficient/appropriate training.
- Understand that confidence in the training depends on leadership.
- Communicate regularly.
- Put continuous improvement processes in place and monitor them.
- Understand that strong leaders communicate effectively with people.
- Believe in the value of your work.
- Believe the threat is real.
- Provide staff with organisational resources.

Participants also mentioned some negative factors:

- Managers fail to encourage, recognise and reward commendable attitudes and behaviours.
- Managers do not communicate well.
- The principles used to reward good performance in security do not reflect those used to reward good performance in safety.
- The equipment staff need to perform their duties is inadequate.
- Leaders fail to make a career in nuclear security attractive.
- A security-conscious attitude is rarely one of the factors considered when promotions to a management level are being made.

One of the most important conclusions was that motivation toward security in a nuclear organisation is basically driven by two areas: operations (civilian) and security (military). Participants also concluded that the four major components (job satisfaction, staff engagement, job fulfilment and pride in job) mentioned by Mr Irving are influenced by the following factors: values and culture, working practices, equipment and environment, organisational characteristics, team identity and functioning, organisation and team support, role clarity, and manager/supervisor behaviour and performance.

Plenary Discussion

Following the brief discussion, a more substantial **plenary discussion** took place that focused on how management can effectively motivate and incentivise employee engagement in security. Some of the main suggestions were:

- Lead by example.
- Offer workshops to increase staff familiarity with and knowledge of security requirements. Cross-train.
- Offer high quality, meaningful professional development opportunities.
- Create an inclusive mission statement.
- Encourage staff ownership and buy-in.
- Give employees more autonomy within the environment of a shared safety/security culture.
- Make it clear that security is part of everyone's job.
- Ensure that managers make employees at all levels feel like they are important and play a relevant role in the organisation. Recognise self-improvement efforts.
- Ensure that managers overcome their own tendencies to be complacent. Realise that sometimes it is managers who need to improve and develop their own motivation before they can achieve improvement in their team's motivation.
- Regard security events as opportunities to improve and to avoid repeating the same mistakes in the future, not as a way to place blame.
- Give employees as much information as possible. Share lessons-learned. Discuss safety and security risks. Provide pre-job briefings as well as regular briefings to staff.
- Demonstrate how important staff are through words of appreciation and concrete actions. Forget being a manager and actively work as part of the team.

- Keep staff informed and provide constructive feedback. Include staff as a part of the organisations team. Treat them the way you want to be treated. Establish a formal process to recognise employee contributions.
- Work to gain the respect and trust of your colleagues. (This is paramount to making any further progress on motivation.)

To address the issue of poor motivation, it is important to:

- Conduct anonymous self-assessments.
- Identify and evaluate different types of motivation. (First diagnose, then create an action plan.)
- Identify the enablers of safety and security.
- Ensure that top managers incorporate safety and security into corporate values.
- Seek to understand root causes in order to solve them.

SESSION 3: LEARNING FROM NUCLEAR SAFETY

The presentations and plenary discussions in this session looked at how nuclear safety motivates employees. This session also addressed how to transfer lessons learned in the safety community to the security community and lessons learned from other sectors.

Mr Jacques Repussard, European Nuclear Safety Training and Tutoring Institute (ENSTTI) (France), gave the first presentation, which was titled *Learning from other disciplines: A nuclear safety perspective*. He introduced ENSTTI to the audience and explained some of the innovations his organisation has made in training and tutoring. He also shared three personal experiences in motivating teams on nuclear safety challenges. The first one occurred in 2003 when the Radioprotection and Nuclear Safety Institute (IRSN) was created. At the time, he faced several challenges, such as negotiating an attractive statutory environment.

Mr Repussard knew he needed to provide experts and researchers with a sense of mission to enhance nuclear safety. Consequently, he worked closely with staff to develop a new mission statement for IRSN and ethical guidance for performing the Institute's missions. He said that by the end of the decade, a strong capital of public trust in the Institute had been built due in large part to staff motivation.

A second example took place in 2011 when IRSN and its experts confronted Fukushima-Daichi events. Motivating staff at this time was central to keep them going *in prolonged overdrive*: This involved recognising individual experts as well as the Institute as a whole (both morally and financially). It also involved implementing research results on severe accident phenomena, allocating resources, and full engagement and risk sharing throughout the line of management. (Some staff members who were not involved in the high visibility operations expressed frustration.)

The third example took place in 2017 when IRSN was asked to contribute to the IAEA's project to develop a *Leadership for Safety Pilot School* for nuclear safety managers in member states. Mr Repussard said out that motivation was essential to running this high visibility project in a short timeframe. Doing so involved developing a team spirit among the IAEA expert group that incorporated their personal experiences when writing case

studies, giving mock presentations of the course in front of IAEA young recruits, and delivering the first course in front of a multinational group of managers. This created a collective mindset of learning from each other.

Mr Repussard ended his presentation by sharing some key lessons learnt. The first is that staff motivation is a key feature of a trustable nuclear safety accountability of nuclear operators as well as of safety authorities. A second is that motivating staff with accountability for nuclear safety is facilitated by:

- Establishing and promoting strong ethical links between operational safety missions and the overall societal ambition of the organisation.
- Ensuring that managers are able to exercise good leadership for safety by implementing safety missions with a holistic approach and adequate involvement of their staff.
- Providing education and training opportunities that not only develop technical skills, but also reflect the above.

Mr Repussard said that the same probably applies to the field of security; however, there are specificities in security that should be recognised and taken into account rather than brushed aside.

Second Presentation in Session 3

Ms Helen Rycraft, IAEA, gave the second presentation in this session. Titled *Safety Motivation—Different?*, the presentation focused on the expectations of safety culture, including how safety culture is supported/captured in the management system and how leadership support safety culture and the management system. Ms Rycraft presented that IAEA mentioned a link between safety and security according to IAEA document GSR 2. She continued her presentation highlighting that safety and security measures must be designed and implemented in an integrated manner and that the management system should take into account the interfaces between safety and security. Furthermore, potential impacts of security measures on safety and potential impacts of safety measures on security shall be identified and shall be resolved without compromising safety or security. The exchange of ideas between, and the combination of, safety culture and security culture.

Ms Rycraft stated that culture is something we can influence and shape, rather than something we can control. Culture work needs to encompass the whole organisation – not only a top-down process. Managers and leaders need to be convinced to change or improvement required, and act to sustain. In addition, she also explained the similarities and clear differences of the cornerstones of safety and security culture. The challenge is to align safety and security and not have them compete. If they are aligned, then, the non-specialists will be able to know how to respond to an event.

Ms Rycraft concluded that safety and security are trying to achieve the same thing. She described the common objective of nuclear safety and security: the protection of people, society and the environment from harmful consequences of a nuclear event. The goal is effective nuclear safety and security.

Finally, a short discussion followed the two presentations and that was the end of day 1. An interesting point about motivating staff during decommissioning process of a nuclear facility was raised. It was said that organisations during this process should really work in the intrinsic motivation rather than the extrinsic. When shutting down nuclear power motivation could address some of the issues that current nuclear power plant being decommissioned have suffered such as: increased number of concerned filled by the employees, staff feeling betray, employees provoking minor radiological releases, etc. Moreover, one of the delegated raised the concerned that an integration of safety and security can make safety to absorb security and that might leave security undeveloped. In that line, the attended agreed to use the term *alignment* instead of *integration*. Furthermore, it was mentioned that unmanaged safety and security issues can present a rise to low motivation.

In conclusion, participants emphasised that managers should share information with their staff and ask them about their views and perspective. As far a safety and security alignment is concerned, organisations should be aware that there are difference among both disciplines that are very well known and that compromises have to been reach. Even though existing differences, people coming from both disciplines have to work together and discuss in order to align their objectives. There should be a discussion in the organisation to find out what is the best solution for the optimal alignment of safety and security for both sides. The organisation has to respect and assume the decision.

SESSION 4: MEASURING MOTIVATION

The purpose of this session was to explore how to measure the elements of motivation and staff perception and opinions. The session also addressed the importance of regular monitoring of organisational culture and motivation.

Dr Mario Martínez-Córcoles from University of Valladolid (Spain) gave a presentation on *Introduction to a methodology for measuring employee motivation*. He explained that measures could be qualitative (individual diaries or interviews) or quantitative (group discussion or questionnaires). Qualitative measures usually are more time consuming and subject to interpretation. On the other hand, quantitative measures such as questionnaire could be inaccurate and their simplicity is usually overestimated. He also explained the importance of the validation process and the concept of validity and reliability when measuring motivation. Once he explained the process, tools and data to measure motivation, Mr Martínez-Córcoles focused on security motivation vs work motivation. He presented the Multidimensional Work Motivation Survey (MWMS) and the Multidimensional Security Motivation Survey (MSMS) to assess security motivation. He finalised his presentation explaining how to conduct the survey and the process of measuring motivation.

After the presentation a discussion on metrics followed. It was mentioned that validation of the results when measuring motivation was always a challenge. Participants discussed that is not possible to export from one country to another motivational surveys or motivational techniques since its needs to be tailored made to the culture and the organisation. In addition, since motivation is a pure human characteristic and is

constantly evolving as human beings and society evolves, measuring techniques need to be constantly reassessed. One of the participants said that even when measuring motivation and nuclear security culture at the same time in the same nuclear power plant, difference culture was found depending on the reactor unit evaluated. On the contrary, it was mentioned that for example, when measuring nuclear security culture in Japan nuclear facilities the results were very homogeneous. These facts support that when measuring motivation, the tools and techniques utilised need to be valid and tailor made to recipients.

Participants also discussed the fact that employees usually do not to give an honest response when taking a survey and tend to be neutral. This is called *central tendency* and surveys already addressed this issue. Participants highlighted that is very important the way organisations and managers communicate to their employees when taking a survey. Internal communication in the organisation should be enhanced to have a successful motivated team. In addition, it was mentioned that when measuring motivation, organisation need to take accountability and responsibility of the results and implement the corrective actions necessary. Furthermore, it is very important that these corrective actions are monitor in order to analyse their impact in the organisation.

Participants concluded that the best way to use measure motivation is through the use of not one single but multiple tools. The measures should be consistent in time and tools updated and adapted to each organisation. Finally, it was mentioned that Human Resources Staff, management committee and unions should initiate the action to measure and be responsible for motivation.

SESSION 5: MOTIVATION AS KEY CONTRIBUTOR NUCLEAR SECURITY CULTURE

This section of the agenda explored the contribution of motivation to nuclear security culture, and the impact and relation of employee motivation towards key elements of nuclear security culture. In this session was also discussed how to stablish a strong nuclear security culture.

A presentation was made by **Carsten Speicher** from the Ministry of the Environment, Climate, Protection and the Energy sector. Mr Speicher explained how culture is defined by personality and learning. He discussed the role of external rewards in employee's motivation and its effects on attituded and behaviours. Furthermore, he illustrated the audience with some practical examples about motivation and 'red lines', where is the limit for sanctions when an employee makes a mistake. He mentioned that the goal is overcoming a faulty error culture and fighting within a well fostered security culture. In addition, he explained the root causes of complacency and which attitudes employees should have toward security. Moreover, he presented the advantages and limitations of motivation and how motivation is addressed in different areas. He finalises his presentation presenting how to foster and maintain a strong nuclear security culture.

A **panel of experts** and a general discussion took place after the presentation. Some of the participants pointed out the importance of processes and procedures regarding nuclear security culture and how relevant is to have as much information as possible written and

that you can delegate tasks but not responsibilities. It was also mentioned that a good way to capture management attention in the field of motivation and nuclear security culture is through budget and economical impact. Following that line, the level of security culture should be evaluated at all levels of the organisation.

Some of the main points made during the panel of experts are the following:

- The lack of motivation in an organisation will increase the money spent in training;
- Within the same organisation, motivating staff is different depending on the background of the employees;
- Motivation as part of security should be an enterprise-wide security programme;
- Culture is not the sum of individual elements but a whole element. Motivation is individual and there should be a continuous exchange between motivation of individuals and culture. Motivation influence culture and vice versa. Culture motivates individuals;
- The management systems and its structure should monitor motivation and define indicator to oversee it;
- When organisations evaluate culture, this is just a picture of a situation in a particular moment and it cannot be easily extrapolated in time;
- Safety and security culture are like personality for your organisation. It is the product of what has been done and what the organisation is currently doing;
- Organisation and culture are something living and dynamic. Wrong management tools and styles can whip out in a moment good culture and good practices;
- Changing the culture of an organisation takes time, but in the meantime short term actions need to be taken such as to improve security and safety attitudes and behaviours;
- It not only about improving culture but also about preserving what you have;
- The mixed of young and senior force impact positively the culture;

CONCLUSION AND WAY FORWARD

The final discussion aimed to identify and discuss tangible and realistic next steps and reviewed the role that operators, regulators, industry, and international organisations must play. In addition, participants were asked to review what workshop topics were most relevant, which ones were directly applicable and which ones were not. Participants were also encouraged to identify what they had most appreciated during the workshop and what they would take away as key points. Below are some of the results:

- It was pointed out that fostering nuclear security culture and motivation is key for an organisation in the nuclear security field;
- Excessive external rewards for an already internally rewarding behaviour can lead to a reduction in intrinsic motivation;
- Knowledge is crucial for taking ownership for an effective security and thus motivations towards attitudes and behaviours;

- A questioning attitude is indispensable to enhance motivation to contribute to security culture;
- The data collecting and evaluation method and its processes have to be regularly checked and modified in the field of motivating staff with accountability for nuclear security;
- Complacency (also of senior management) is the worst enemy for an effective security culture;
- Clearly define the boundary and priorities between safety and security and communicate them to the staff. Knowing contentious issues between safety and security enhance mutual understanding;
- When running employee surveys, attention should be paid to staff perspectives since they do not usually trust managerial actions. Questions need to be precisely chosen and communication from corporate is a key factor;
- The 'silo-thinking' should be overcome in motivation and nuclear security culture;
- Calling for constructive and concrete feedback should be a regular measure and not only if something went wrong before;
- Realistic and practical examples (and possible consequences) should be a regular component of training and education in the whole organisation, not only for security personnel;
- Regulators should be independent. They cannot address motivation directly, but they can suggest actions to the operators. They will identify what should be fixed but will not say how. Regulators should also evaluate their own security culture inspections;
- In terms of motivating staff, a pro-active rather than reactive attitude can enhance motivation within the organisation;
- Nobody can offer a recipe for motivation;

Participants also mentioned the following future challenges:

- Bringing together regulators, operators and law enforcements to discuss about motivation and nuclear security culture. Education and training program to transform organisations;
- Raising awareness at different areas;
- Constantly monitoring of motivation within organisation. Frequency is a relevant factor;
- Establishing a 'supporting culture' (selfish actions should be sanctioned and not rewarded, everybody feeling responsible for his colleague, self-protecting and protecting the colleagues should be daily routine);
- Learning from other sectors such as aviation or biotechnology could have a positive impact in nuclear security culture. There have been successful exchange of information between experienced aviation pilots or air traffic controllers and employees from the nuclear sector.

Finally, during the conclusion session WINS presented draft training materials about motivating staff with accountability for nuclear security. Participants suggested improvements and provided their views on the training package to improve it. All participants will receive final training materials.