



World Institute for
Nuclear Security

Workshop on Countering Violent Extremism and the Insider Threat in the Nuclear Sector

03 - 05 December 2019. London, UK

Pierre Legoux, WINS Head of Programmes



PARIS, FRANCE
2:03 PM

FOX NEWS
LIVE

TERROR ATTACK IN PARIS
GUNMEN STORM SATIRICAL NEWSPAPER OFFICES

ALER

... FRENCH PRES FRANCOIS HOLLANDE IS CALLING THE INCIDENT A T



BRISQ/FEDERAL POLICE/AGC


Threat and consequences




- ❑ The **Threat** is real!
- ❑ We have evidences that the **nuclear industry** is a **Target!**
- ❑ The potential **Consequences** would be significant, have worldwide implications and are a “prize worth pursuing.”

We need to take the problem seriously!

- What is the nature of the VE threat?**
 - What factors lead to violent extremism?
 - What are the objectives and motivations of VEs?
 - What are their known intentions and capabilities?
- How different is it from other threats?**
- What scenarios should we anticipate?**
- How might this threat continue to evolve?**

Mitigating the threat





Workshop Objectives

- ❑ Develop a better understanding of the processes leading to radicalisation and violent extremism
- ❑ Discuss motivation, intention and capabilities of VEs
- ❑ Explore the role of different stakeholders in mitigating the threat
- ❑ Review the current measures in light of the VE threat specificities
- ❑ Discuss whether the nuclear sector has any features that make it more or less vulnerable to becoming a VE target.
- ❑ Discuss how to develop resilient arrangements⁷ able to adapt to a continuously evolving threat
- ❑ Listen to best practices from another sector (aviation)

DAY 1 – TUESDAY 03 DECEMBER 2019

- Opening: Developing a Common Understanding
- Session 1: Understanding the VE Threat and the Risks to Nuclear Security
- Session 2: Examining Best Practice in Risk Mitigation and Exploring the Remaining Vulnerabilities

DAY 2 – WEDNESDAY 04 DECEMBER 2019

- Session 3: Optimising Vetting and Background Checks in a Rapidly Changing World
- Session 4: Red Flags and the Art of the Possible in Threat Mitigation

DAY 3 – THURSDAY 05 DECEMBER 2019

- Session 5: Responding Effectively to a VE Incident
- Session 6: Measuring the Effectiveness of Mitigation Programmes
- Closing: Key Findings and Next Steps

Pre-event survey results

| Neither Agree Nor Disagree | Somewhat Agree | Strongly Agree | Agree Completely |
|----------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|----------------------------------|
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
Some of your expectations

- **Learn** more about VE and insider threat in the nuclear sector
- **Meet** people of similar interests. **Network** and keep contacts. Have new ideas!
- Obtain a deeper understanding on how the VE threat can be anticipated and mitigated.
- Discuss how various stakeholders/disciplines can **work together** to reduce the risk.
- **Share experiences.** Better understand how other organisations and countries address the problem.
- **Strengthen security arrangements.** Identify the key elements of a comprehensive mitigation programme.
- Identify sources of valuable information on the topic.
- Review methods to **evaluate the effectiveness** of the insider threat mitigation **programmes in place**

Understanding the threat


Question 1

I am familiar with the insider threat



Question 2


I have a good understanding of what is meant by violent extremism (VE) and how it could impact the nuclear sector



Addressing the threat


Question 3

Current insider threat mitigation programmes already adequately address the threat of a radicalised staff member in the workforce




Question 4

In my country, relevant stakeholders (nuclear operators, law enforcement, regulator...) have established effective coordination and cooperation mechanisms to address the VE threat




Question 5

In my country, the screening (vetting) process is sufficiently rigorous to detect radicalised people applying to a position at a nuclear facility



Question 6


In my country, the screening (vetting) process would quickly detect the radicalisation of a staff member who holds a high level security clearance.



DETECTING AND REPORTING


Question 7

In my experience, staff and line managers at nuclear organisations have been trained to identify and report cases of suspected radicalisation



Question 8


I trust senior managers of nuclear organisations to deal effectively with reports of suspected radicalisation that employees and managers make



SHARING EXPERIENCE


Question 9

When an insider incident happens, there are mechanisms in place to support the sharing of information and lessons learnt among nuclear organisations



Question 10


There are mechanisms in place to support the sharing of information and lessons learnt between the nuclear industry and other sectors



EVALUATING THE MEASURES


Question 11

Metrics and other security indicators for measuring the performance of insider mitigation provisions are available



Question 12

Vulnerability assessments (or similar approaches to evaluate the effectiveness of security programmes) include scenarios involving radicalised individuals



Lack of awareness of the VE threat. Do we understand what a violent extremist is? Do we really believe in the threat? Have we assessed its differences with other threats? Are we complacent?

Complex threat requiring a more dynamic and complete set of policies and programmes. Have we identified all stakeholders required to mitigate the VE threat? Are we ensuring their effective coordination and cooperation? Do we have a long term, sustainable approach?

Lack of knowledge of 'what works' to prevent and counter violent extremism (leading not only to underfunding, but also inefficient use of finite resources, and potentially counter-productive interventions to address violent extremism built on wrong assumptions).

Lack of sharing of experiences. Organisations are not willing to share their mistakes as that would expose them as failures.

Challenges in establishing effective vetting mechanisms.

Unquestioned trust of established employees. Are pre- /post-employment vetting procedures effective? Are they adapted to self-radicalisation?

Risk of instigating future disgruntlement. Are there concerns about offending people's personal beliefs? Is there a risk of exaggerating the situation. Could we go beyond religion or ideology and embed the effort into violence prevention more generally.

Political interferences (use of “threat to national security” for politician goals)

Reactive attitude (investigation, arrest, and prosecution) instead of prevention. Understand how a person becomes motivated to commit violent extremism. Anticipate! Do we have the right set of people and management skills in a predominant engineer-like work environment?

Political instability and civil wars provide foundations for extremism

Some specific questions!

- Where and when was the last violent extremist insider threat identified in the nuclear industry? What did we learn?
- How can operators and vetting service providers can better work together and manage the risk effectively?
- How are detected individuals dealt with?
- How do you overcome differences between respecting the rights of freedom to personal beliefs and upholding the need for security in the nuclear sector?
- How can we tailor generic recommendations and measures to specific institutions and regions of the world?
- How to increase buy-in from key stakeholders? As security professionals, do we discuss security issues enough with our medical or HR colleagues and vice versa? What are the impediments to improving this situation?

Workshop Process

- PRESENTATIONS
- PLENARY DISCUSSIONS
- GROUP DISCUSSIONS
- E-VOTING





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03-05 DEC 2019
LONDON, UNITED KINGDOM (UK)

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The World Institute for Nuclear Security (WINS) is pleased to announce an international workshop on Countering Violent Extremism and the Insider Threat in the Nuclear Sector to be conducted in London from

SUCCESS CRITERIA

- LEARN, SHARE, CONTRIBUTE
- MEET & NETWORK
- ENJOY YOUR TIME



IDEAS
into
A.C.T.I.O.N

SECURITY IS IMPROVED!

- ACTIONS FOR YOURSELF
- SUGGESTIONS FOR YOUR ORGANISATION



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Have a Great Workshop !



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