



Vattenfall's decommissioning strategy for Ringhals 1 & 2 in Sweden

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
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Overview

1. **Vattenfall** at a glance
2. The **Business Unit Nuclear Decommissioning** (BUND)
3. **Ringhals 1 & 2 Decommissioning**
 - a) *The Ringhals NPP*
 - b) *Division of responsibilities & timeline*
 - c) *Decommissioning work*
 - d) *BUND's evolving organisation*
 - e) *Swedish system for waste management*
4. **Security considerations**
 - a) *Arising from the legislative & regulatory context*
 - b) *Arising from the licence transfer & division of responsibilities*
 - c) *Arising from Vattenfall's approach to decommissioning*
 - d) *Materials & waste management fundamentals*

Vattenfall at a glance

Electricity generation breakdown by technology, 2018



¹Wind includes biomass and waste generation (0.4 TWh)

6.5 million

Electricity customers

2.1 million

Heat customers

3.3 million

Electricity network customers

2.4 million


Gas customers

19,910

Employees

Main markets

- Sweden
- Germany
- Netherlands
- Denmark
- United Kingdom



Business Unit Nuclear Decommissioning (BUND)

Created by Vattenfall in 2016

Mission: Safe, responsible and cost efficient decommissioning of Vattenfall's nuclear facilities in Sweden and Germany

Decommissioning of our nuclear facilities

GERMANY KKB (1977–2007)

KKK (1983–2011)

Ringhals 1 (1976–2020)

Ringhals 2 (1975–2019)

Ågestaverket (1963–1974)

SVAFO R2 (1960–2005)

Forsmark 1 (1980–2040)

Forsmark 2 (1981–2041)

Forsmark 3 (1985–2045)

Ringhals 3 (1981–2041)

Ringhals 4 (1983–2043)

Ringhals 1 & 2 Decommissioning



Ringhals

- Ringhals is the largest Swedish NPP
- Covers approx. 20 per cent of the total demand for electricity in Sweden
- Operator: Ringhals AB
- Owners: Vattenfall (70,4 %) and Sydkraft Nuclear Power (29,6 %)
- Number of reactors in operation: 4
- Production capacity: approx. 30 TWh/year
- Installed power: 3951 MW
- No. of employees: ca 1300



- In 2015, Vattenfall decided to close Ringhals 1 & 2 some five years ahead of schedule
- Ringhals 3 & 4 are planned to continue to operate into the mid-2040s

Division of responsibilities

- **Vattenfall is the majority owner** of Ringhals but has the exclusive responsibility for the decommissioning
- **Strategic decision** to separate out continued operation of Ringhals 3 & 4 from the decommissioning of units 1 & 2
 - **Ringhals AB responsible for continued operation** at site
 - **Decommissioning to be managed by BUND**
 - **Vattenfall has applied for a transfer of the nuclear license** for units 1 & 2
 - **Functional separation at the site** is a key enabler
- Agreements between BUND and Ringhals AB for “**post-operational**” **activities** at units 1 & 2, and delivering agreed ‘state at licence transfer’
- **Cooperation between BUND and Ringhals AB** on staff retention & transfer

Responsibilities & timeline



◆ License Transfer

Ringhals AB

Operations R2 Post-Operations R2

Operations R1 Post-Operations R1

Prepare end-state

BUND

Prepare Decommissioning

Execute Decommissioning


The decommissioning work at Ringhals 1 & 2

- Immediate decommissioning strategy
- “Inside-out” approach:
 - Starts with the more highly active & contaminated components inside the units
 - Progresses towards lesser active and uncontaminated plant sections
- Three broad categories of work:
 - Special Items D&D
 - “Bulk” D&D
 - Conventional D&D


Package	Definition
Special Items D&D	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Large complex activated or highly contaminated components (e.g. Reactor Vessel Internals, Reactor Vessels and Steam Generator and Pressuriser) <hr/>
Bulk D&D	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Contaminated systems and components that are not part of Special Items D&D• Includes, but is not limited to, components (turbines, pumps, valves, pipes etc.) and contaminated concrete in the reactor building, auxiliary building, and in the turbine hall.• Also includes decontamination of rooms and structures. <hr/>
Conventional D&D	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Systems, components, equipment and buildings that are classified as “free to release”

Evolving demands on the BUND organization

Developing from the planning phase ...



... to the Execution phase



Strategy formulation

Internal focus

Few stakeholders/interfaces

Minor cost

Small organization / limited no. of resources

Simple risk mitigation

VS.

Strategy execution

External focus (Commercial, Suppliers, etc.)


Many stakeholders/multiple interfaces

Major cost

Large organization / extensive no. of resources

Complex risk mitigation

Swedish system for waste management



- Integrated national waste system
- Financed through a national Fund, built up during operation of NPPs
- Centralised interim spent fuel storage facility (“CLAB”) allows spent fuel to be moved quickly away from NPPs
- Transports to CLAB and central repositories by a special boat
- Interim waste storage at NPP sites

Security considerations

Arising from the legislative & regulatory context

Issue	Considerations
Suitability of decommissioning framework	Comprehensive legislative & regulatory framework
	Focus has been on ensuring suitability for facilities in operation and modernisation/construction Not yet fully adapted for implementation to decommissioning
	Efforts by regulator to provide clarification on interpretation and implementation for decommissioning
	Theoretically enables a graded approach where requirements are related to underlying risk levels (including for security) – including transition to lower security requirements
The regulators	Two national regulators with responsibility for security at nuclear installations – safety authority (Strålsäkerhetsmyndigheten, SSM) and police authority (Polismyndigheten)
	Staffing issues in security department (bottlenecks for decisions)


Arising from the licence transfer and division of responsibilities between Ringhals & BUND

Issue	Security considerations
Security during the post-operation phase (prior to licence transfer)	Remains the responsibility of Ringhals
Spent fuel management	Remains the responsibility of Ringhals
Separation of Ringhals 1&2 from 3&4	Security infrastructure and access controls developed for Ringhals site, will need to ensure separation and have systems for both licensees ; Possibility for some shared arrangements but will need prior approval from regulators
BUND organisation as licensee for Ringhals 1&2	BUND organisation needs to demonstrate its readiness to be licensee in advance of transfer , including for security BUND will have exclusive responsibility for Ringhals 1 & 2 after licence transfer

Arising from Vattenfall's approach to decommissioning

Strategy issue	Security considerations
Personnel screening & security procedures suitable for decommissioning	Reliance on external contractors for work on site
	Site access & zoning , including transition to lower requirements as work progresses
Intellectual property	IP ownership and control between: <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Ringhals & BUND• Ringhals, BUND and plant/equipment vendors• BUND and contractors
IT & data - access to systems & information; data modification & record-keeping	Balance between ensuring integrity of systems and information; and providing the necessary degree of access to facilitate the work
Security infrastructure	Need for ongoing adaption of infrastructure as facility modified as work progresses
Materials & waste management	<i>See following slide</i>

Materials & waste management fundamentals



Integrating these requirements into our planning from the outset minimises potential conflicts between security and effective delivery of our decommissioning projects.

Thank you!

Business Unit Nuclear Decommissioning

The safe, responsible and cost-efficient decommissioning and dismantling of Vattenfall's nuclear facilities

