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***PRESENTATION ON  
DEVELOPING  
COMPREHENSIVE  
APPROACHES FOR REDUCING  
AND DEFEATING VIOLENT  
EXTREMISM- NIGERIAN  
PERPECTIVE***

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***COUNTER TERRORISM CENTRE***

***OFFICE OF THE NAIONAL SECURITY ADVISER***

***NIGERIA***

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# PACKAGED IED UNIT



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# VEHICLE BORNE IED



Veh info: 4 door, Brownstone in color, Honda Accord, VIN number: 1HGCB7656MA018846. Engine block #: F22A12513177

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## HAND THROWN IEDS







# PACKAGED IED UNITS





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## **BOKO HARAM PERSON BORNE IED** **CONFIGURATIONS**



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**PICTURES OF SUICIDE WAIST POUCH IED AND COMPONENTS**



**EXPLOSIVES COMPARTMENT**  
**BRASS CASE OF ANTI AIRCRAFT ROUND**  
**FILLED WITH AMMONIUM NITRATE AND**  
**FUEL OIL**

**WAIST STRAPS AND**  
**POUCHE MADE OF**  
**TEXTILE MATERIAL**



**ROCKER SWITCH**  
**FOR INITIATION**

**9V BATTERIES WRAPPED IN**  
**BLACK CELLOTAPE**

**COMMAND WIRE**

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## PRESSURE PLATE OPERATED BURIED IEDS



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**PICTURE OF BH PROJECTILE IED**  
**BEING MANUFACTURING FACTORY**



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## **CANDY PROPELLANT**

***Mixture of Pottassium Nitrate and Sugar***

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# **COMMON EXPLOSIVES PRECURSORS AND FUELS EXPERIENCED IN NIGERIA**

## **Oxidizers**

- 1. Urea (Lokoja)
- 2. Urea Nitrate (Lokoja)
- 3. Ammonium Nitrate (70% of IED incidents in Nigeria, including Suleja and EMAB Plaza)
- 4. Black powder, mixed with charcoal (kano, Borno, Yobe, Gombe)
- 5. Sulphur (added as energetic, recovered in Suleja 2013)
- 6. Pottassium Nitrate (Maiduguri)
- 7. Mercury Fulminate (in improvised detonators)
- 8. Pottassium Perchlorate (Maiduguri 2012)
- 9. Tri Nitro Toluelene (Nyanya 2014)
- 10. Penta Erythrol Tetranitrate (UN house)
- 11. Nitrocellulose (kano, Borno, Yobe, Gombe)



# **COMMON EXPLOSIVES PRECURSORS AND FUELS EXPERIENCED IN NIGERIA (CONT..)**

## **FUELS**

- **1. Diesel (Most IED Incidents involving Ammonium, Urea and potassium Nitrates)**
- **2. Sugar (Used in Lokoja, Kaduna, Maiduguri Kano and Gombe , mostly with Ammonium Nitrate)**
- **3. Coffee ( Kano)**
- **4. Aluminium, Sulphur, lead (aluminium used in Suleja and Kaduna)**
- **5. Icing sugar (more refined, effective but expensive alternative to raw sugar)**
- **6. Saw dust**
- **7. Charcoal is mostly blended with gun powder (used in Maiduguri, and Damaturu in 2012)**

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# SOME HME PRECURSORS EMPLOYED

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**BLACK POWDER (Sulphur, Potassium nitrate)**  
**CHARCOAL**



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# SAWDUST






**HYDROGEN PEROXIDE USED AS OXIDIZERS**  
**(ALSO REACTS WITH ACETONE TO FORM**  
**ACETONE PEROXIDE)**







# LEAD AZIDE (Explosive material, used in detonators to initiate secondary explosives)






**POTASSIUM CHLORATE**  
**(low explosive for making safety fuse)**  
**SODIUM AZIDE**  
**(for improvised detonator)**








## SODIUM CARBONATE (Oxidizer)





# ALUMINIUM POWDER







# PRILLED AMMONIUM SULPHATE AND UREA NITRATE







# SULPHUR POWDER





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# NANO ENERGETICS



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# FUSE POWDER (Potassium Chlorate + Sawdust)



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# SOME IMPROVISED ACCESSORIES

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# IMPROVISED SAFETY FUSE







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# IMPROVISED DETONATORS




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# EXPLOSIVES PRECURSORS USED BY BH 2010-2013




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## EXPLOSIVES PRECURSORS USED BY BH 2014/2015




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## COUNTER IED OPERATIONS IN THE NORTH EAST (CONT.)

Statistics have it that in the last 3 months BH IED attacks have increased from 22% - 45.45% between the months of Aug to October with an increased employment of female suicide bombers



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# **STRATEGIC MEASURES FOR THE CONTROL OF EXPLOSIVES, ACCESSORIES, FERTILIZERS AND OTHER PRECURSOR SUBSTANCES IN NIGERIA**

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# **MEASURES FOR FERTILIZER CONTROL**

- ***a. Compulsory registration of all fertilizer producers and suppliers with Fertilizer Producers and Suppliers Association of Nigeria (FEPSAN).***
- ***b. Compulsory registration of all fertilizer distributors and farmers in Nigeria under the Federal Ministry of Agriculture Growth Enhancement Scheme (FMARD GES), starting with the North Eastern States.***
- ***c. Speedy conclusion of the National Identity Management Commission (NIMC) issuance of microchip identity cards to registered farmers and distributors under the FMARD GES, starting with those in the NE States.***

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# **MEASURES FOR FERTILIZER CONTROL (cont)**

- (i) *Issuance of permit to distribute/sell stipulated brands and quantities of fertilizer to dealers after proper vetting. Permits to buy and sell explosives used in the explosives sector were to be modified for adoption.*
- (ii) *Monthly charting of movement of fertilizer to and from different parts of Nigeria was to be employed, as presently done for the explosives sector.*
- (iii) *Bulk purchases of fertilizers, were to be restricted to cashless payment methods, which could be tracked for investigative purposes.*
- (iv) *The NPF EOD and the Military (for NE States facing insurgency) were to provide adequate escort for transported stock of fertilizer nationwide, from the port of landing to the point of storage/usage.*
- (v) *FMARD in conjunction with other relevant agencies were to conduct regular checks and inspection of fertilizer storage facilities nationwide.*

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# **MEASURES FOR FERTILIZER CONTROL (cont)**

- e. *A subcommittee was to be constituted, comprising representatives from ONSA, FMARD, NPF, DSS and NAFDAC, to work out modalities for the implementation of the above recommended measures.*
- f. *A sub committee comprising representatives from ONSA, FMARD, NARICT, NAFDAC and other relevant research institutes was to be established to research into suitable inert tagging substances including radio frequency identification branding systems for the different fertilizer brands in Nigeria. Implementation could start with Urea, Potassium Nitrate and other brands of fertilizers that are being used for IEDs in Nigeria.*
- g. *The temporary embargo on importation of Urea and Potassium Nitrate Fertilizers was to be sustained until the implementation of the above recommended measures by FMARD.*
- h. *Systematic drawdown on importation and use of chemical fertilizers (that could be used to synthesise explosives) in Nigeria was proposed, to be gradually replaced by minero-organic fertilizer, as presented by the National Research Institute for Chemical Technology (NARICT).*

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# **MEASURES FOR FERTILIZER CONTROL (cont)**

- *i. The replacement of chemical fertilizers which could be used to synthesise explosives with organic fertilizers was to commence in the North Eastern States, as a matter of urgency.*
- *j. Feasibility studies on the adoption of organic fertilizer was to be conducted, to assess if output capacity of NARICT and other recognised manufacturers would meet the demand of North Eastern States in the first instance.*
- *k. The NSA was to lobby the National Assembly for speedy passage of the National Fertilizer Bill, as submitted by the Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development. A draft letter to the National Assembly is hereby enclosed.*
- *l. FMARD, NAFDAC, NPF EOD and ONSA EDAO were to peruse the Draft National Fertilizer Bill to ascertain that all relevant issues relating to security of fertilizer in Nigeria were well covered.*
- *m. Border posts were to be strengthened adequately to check smuggling of fertilizers that could be used to produce explosives and other precursor substances into Nigeria.*

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# **MEASURES FOR EXPLOSIVES CONTROL**

- ***1. An inter ministerial team consisting of representatives from the Min of Mines, DSS, NPF, NCS and the Mil constituted to verify the activities, products, facilities, emplaced security measures and stockholdings of listed explosives and accessories importers and distributors in Nigeria.***
- ***2. Report of the verification exercise should be used as a criterion to prune down the number of explosives importers and distributors in Nigeria.***
- ***3. The number of explosives importers and distribution companies in Nigeria should be reduced to a maximum of 6. One for each of the 6 geopolitical zone.***
- ***4. Issuance of explosives licences to companies should be suspended until after the nationwide verification exercise.***

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# **MEASURES FOR EXPLOSIVES CONTROL (cont)**

## **EXPLOSIVES LICENSING AND REGULATIONS**

- ***5. The revised Nigerian Explosives Act of 2009 should be examined further, for appropriate amendments in the areas of security and scale of punishment (capital punishment to be considered for explosives crimes, in view of the scale of destruction of lives and properties resulting from such).***
- ***6. Request for End User Certificate (EUC) for explosives and accessories was to be properly scrutinised for quantitative control.***
- ***7. The ban on use of dynamite for blasting operations in Nigeria was to be enforced.***

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# **MEASURES FOR EXPLOSIVES CONTROL (cont)**

## **• RESPONSIBILITIES FOR EXPLOSIVES HANDLING AND BLASTING OPERATIONS**

- 8.        *The MMS should, henceforth take sole responsibility for the regulation and control of the handling of both high and low order commercial explosives in Nigeria.***
- 9.        *Operation of freelance blasters in Nigeria should be criminalised, with appropriate sanction for culprits and accomplices.***
- 10.      *All explosives and accessories handling quarries and companies in Nigeria are to as a matter of urgency implement the following security measures:***
  - a.        *Installation of CCTV Cameras at strategic points.***
  - b.        *Installation of electronic access control system.***
  - c.        *Installation of intruder alarm system.***
  - d.        *The ban on use of surface or trailer mounted magazines in storage, manufacturing and quarry sites should be aggressively enforced. Only reinforced concrete explosives safe should be employed.***
  - e.        *Storage of explosives and accessories in separate places.***
- 11.      *Daily blasting operation by construction companies should be done in the presence of representatives of the DSS, NPF and Mines Office. This is to ascertain that the quantity of explosive brought out from the armoury is utilized and any leftover is recorded and returned to the armoury.***

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# **MEASURES FOR EXPLOSIVES CONTROL (cont)**

- ***12. Ensure that all employees of blasting companies taking part in the handling of explosive should be thoroughly searched and declared not to be in possession of explosives or accessories at the end of the blasting, before leaving the site.***
- ***13. Ensure that thorough search of the blasting site is carried out with the use of relevant explosive detectors after each days blasting.***
- ***14. The transportation of explosives and accessories should be done under adequate security protection with GPS tracking device mounted on the vehicle.***
- ***15. All imported or manufactured explosives and accessories should be appropriately branded and batched for ease of identification and tracking during explosives crime scenarios.***

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# **CBRNE THREAT AND NATIONAL SECURITY**

- ❑ *The security of the nation is the primary and most*
  - *important concern of the government. The National Security Architecture has over time evolved to effectively counter the dynamic nature of crime, militancy, insurgency and terrorism in our society.*
  
- ❑ *In recent time, the Federal Government through*
  - *the Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA) have developed strategic and policy documents*
    - ❖ *The National Security Strategy*
    - ❖ *National Counter Terrorism Strategy*
    - ❖ *Cyber Security Strategy*
    - ❖ *The CT Crisis Response Doctrine (Which Is Ongoing)*
  
- ❑ *The Documents identified the Chemical,*
  - *Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and Explosives (CBRNE) security, as part of the overall national security strategy.*
  
- ❑ *Our individual approach has denied us the collective benefits of elaborating and harmonising this special area of expertise, even in the ongoing Crisis Response Effort.*

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# **CBRNE THREAT AND NATIONAL SECURITY (Cont..)**

- **Scope**

- ❑ ***Current CBRNE Efforts in Nigeria – Quick assessment***
- ❑ ***Definitions***
- ❑ ***Understanding the CBRNE Components***
- ❑ ***Potential CBRNE Risk/Threat in Nigeria***
- ❑ ***Institutionalization of CBRNE Capabilities and Effort in Nigeria***
- ❑ ***EU CBRN CoE Framework – A Model for our National CBRNE Structure***
- ❑ ***National CBRNE Structure***
- ❑ ***Function of the National Team***
- ❑ ***Pathway***

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# **CBRNE THREAT AND NATIONAL SECURITY (Cont..)**

## **Current CBRNE Efforts In Nigeria – Assessment**

### **■ Achievements**

- ❖ ***Control – EUC, Mov Chart, Mandate to Regulators***
- ❖ ***Capacity Building – HRP (CERT)***
- ❖ ***Safety And Security Of Facilities And Material***
- ❖ ***Human Development***
- ❖ ***Research And Development***
- ❖ ***Detection, Mitigation And Response To Threat***

### **■ Challenges**

- ❖ ***Fragmented Approach***
- ❖ ***Inefficiency(single Organization)***
- ❖ ***Counter Production***
- ❖ ***Limited Resources,***
- ❖ ***Expertise and Statutory Power***

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# **STRATEGIC MEASURES FOR ACHIEVING NUCLEAR SECURITY IN NIGERIA**

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# **CENTRE FOR ENERGY RESEARCH AND TRAINING ABU ZARIA**



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# CHANGING OF HIGH ENRICHED TO LOW ENRICHED URANIUM IN CERT



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# **STRATEGIC MEASURES FOR ACHIEVING NUCLEAR SECURITY IN NIGERIA**

- ❑ CERT Compliance with HRP Standards as spelt out by International Standards***
- ❑ Adequate Physical Security Measures in Nuclear Facility***
- ❑ Periodic Vetting of Critical Staff of the Facility***
- ❑ Control of Importation/Exportation of Nuclear Materials***
- ❑ Control of Transportation of Nuclear Materials***
- ❑ Control of Storage of Nuclear Materials***
- ❑ Control of Usage and Disposal of Nuclear Materials***
- ❑ Institutionalization of HRP Capabilities and Efforts in Nuclear Supporting Sectors Nigeria***
- ❑ Establishment of National CBRNE Team in Nigeria***

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


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# CBRNE THREAT AND NATIONAL SECURITY (Cont..)

## • *Understanding the Relationship Between the CBRNE Components*

- ❑ *There is no single agency that has the adequate resources, expertise and statutory power to successfully deal with all aspects of the CBRNE risk/threat*
- ❑ *A holistic approach is an efficient way of mitigating the risks*



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# **CBRNE THREAT AND NATIONAL SECURITY (Cont..)**

## **NATIONAL CBRNE STRUCTURE**

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# • THE NIGERIA CBRNE STRUCTURE - PROPOSED

• **NSA**

• **NATIONAL CBRNE OFFICE**

• **TEAM SECRETARIAT**

• **TECHNICAL SUPPORT (INT'L/DOMESTIC)**

- **CBRN CoE**
- **CSP**
- **OPCW**
- **PNS**
- **NACBWC**

• **DOMESTIC/INT'L COORDINATION**

- **NATIONAL FOCAL POINT**
- **NWG**
- **TWG**
- **DESK OFFICERS**
- **FOCAL PERSONS**

• **STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION / POLICY**

- **DOCTRINE**
- **TTP**
- **SOP**
- **CBRNE INTEL**
- **COUNTER MEASURES**

• **RESEARCH/TRAINING**

- **CHEMICAL SECURITY**
- **BIOLOGICAL SECURITY**
- **RADIOLOGICAL SECURITY**
- **NUCLEAR SECURITY**
- **EXPLOSIVES SECURITY**

• **NORTH CENTRAL CBRNE TEAM**

**DETECTION, MITIGATION & RESPONSE**

• **NORTH EAST CBRNE TEAM**

**DETECTION, MITIGATION & RESPONSE**

• **NORTH WEST CBRNE TEAM**

**DETECTION, MITIGATION & RESPONSE**

• **NNRA**  
• **CERT**  
• **NAEC**  
• **NEMA**  
• **NIMASA**  
• **NAFDAC**  
• **NARICT**  
• **NIRPR**  
• **OTHER**  
• **MDAS**

• **ONSA**  
• **PC4**  
• **MOD**  
• **DHQ**  
• **AHQ CBRNE**  
• **NHQ CBRNE**  
• **HQNAF CBRNE**  
• **NPF EOD**  
• **NSCDC CBRNE**  
• **NIA CBRNE**  
• **DIA CBRNE**  
• **DSS CBRNE**  
• **NCS**  
• **NFS**  
• **NIS**

• **OSFG**  
• **FMOFA**  
• **FMOST**  
• **FMWR**  
• **FMARD**  
• **MSMD**  
• **FMOH**  
• **FMOE**  
• **FMJ**  
• **FMOI**

• **SOUTH EAST CBRNE TEAM**

**DETECTION, MITIGATION & RESPONSE**

• **SOUTH SOUTH CBRNE TEAM**

**DETECTION, MITIGATION & RESPONSE**

• **SOUTH WEST CBRNE TEAM**

**DETECTION, MITIGATION & RESPONSE**



# • ROLES OF MDAS

SRL	MDA	CHEMICAL SECURITY	BIOLOGICAL SECURITY	RADIOLOGICAL SECURITY	NUCLEAR SECURITY	EXPLOSIVE SECURITY	RMKS
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)
1.	CERT			✖	✖		<b>DMR</b>
2.	NARICT	✖				✖	<b>DMR</b>
3.	NIRPR			✖			
4.	NAEC			✖	✖		
5.	NNRA			✖	✖		<b>DM</b>
6.	NAFDAC	✖	✖			✖	
7.	OSFG	✖	✖				
8.	FMOFA						
9.	FMOST	✖	✖			✖	<b>D</b>
10.	NIMASA	✖		✖	✖		
11.	NEMA					✖	<b>R</b>
12.	FMARD		✖	✖		✖	<b>M</b>
13.	FMSD					✖	<b>M</b>
14.	FMOH	✖	✖	✖	✖	✖	<b>DR</b>
15.	FMWR	✖	✖	✖	✖	✖	





# • *Specialised Role Of MDAs (Cont)*

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)
16.	ONSA						<b>DMR</b>
17.	PC4						<b>MR</b>
18.	MOD						
19.	DHQ	✖	✖	✖	✖	✖	
20.	AHQ CBRNE	✖	✖	✖	✖	✖	
21.	NHQ CBRNE	✖	✖	✖	✖		
22.	HQ NAF CBRNE	✖		✖	✖	✖	
23.	NPF CBRNE	✖	✖	✖	✖	✖	
24.	NSCDC CBRNE	✖				✖	
25.	DSS CBRNE					✖	
26.	NIA CBRNE					✖	
27.	DIA CBRNE					✖	
28.	NCS						
29.	NFS						
30.	NIS						



# • **SPECIALISED ROLE OF MDAS (CONT)**

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)
31.	FMOE						<b>DMR</b>
32.	FMOI	×	×	×	×	×	
33.	FMOJ	×	×	×	×	×	<b>M</b>
34.							
35.							
36.							
37.							
38.							
39.							
40.							



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# **CBRNE THREAT AND NATIONAL SECURITY (Cont..)**

## ***National Security Architecture - Overview of ONSA Role:***

- ☐ *Coordination***
- ☐ *Facilitating***
- ☐ *Monitoring***
- ☐ *Evaluation***
- ☐ *Training and Support***
- ☐ *Harmonization of all security assets and expertise toward the safety and security of lives and property in Nigeria.***

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# **CONCLUSION**

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**THANK YOU**

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