

WINS and iia Webinar on

SECURITY OF GAMMA IRRADIATION FACILITIES USED FOR RADIATION PROCESSING

2nd September 2020 at 03:30pm CEST



World Institute for
Nuclear Security



Welcome and thank you for joining us!

Today's objectives:

- ❑ Review the risk and the need for security
- ❑ Discuss physical security features and security management principles
- ❑ Highlight the importance of addressing the rapidly evolving cyberthreat
- ❑ Share experience of gamma irradiation industry expert
- ❑ Encourage all participants to adopt best security practice



WELCOME from the **International Irradiation Association**

'The Global Voice for the Radiation Processing Industry'

www.iiaglobal.com

Martin Comben - General Manager, Gamma Irradiation



- ❑ **Gamma irradiation industry is highly engaged**
 - has an exemplary safety and security record

However...

- ❑ **Threats evolve**
- ❑ **Research shows:**
 - Measures to address human factors – **fall short**
 - Cybersecurity regulations are not keeping pace with the **cyber** threat

❑ Designing and Implementing Operational Security Measures at Gamma Irradiation Facilities




David Jackson

Senior Radiation Safety Manager
Steris Applied Sterilization Technologies (AST)

❑ Credible Threat

❑ Operators experience & perspectives

❑ Cybersecurity Best Practice



Brandon Gorton

Cybersecurity Task Lead
& Principal Investigator
Pacific Northwest National Laboratory



Derek Higgins

Regional Project Manager
Pacific Northwest National Laboratory



Andreas Ostrowicki

Managing Director, Beta-Gamma Service GmbH & Co. KG (BGS)



Cherin Balt

Managing Director, High Energy Processing Cape (Pty) Ltd (HEPRO)



Doug Day

Physical Protection Expert, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL)

- Please ask questions and participate in the E-voting

Some Housekeeping items

There are 4 tabs on the top of your screen (“Chat”; “Questions”; “Polls” and “People”):

- Feel free to use the “**Chat**” option to share any insight you may have
- You can type and submit your questions through the “**Questions**” tab. Any questions which we are not able to answer during the webinar due to time limitations will be consolidated and answered after the webinar.
- We will have several voting questions during this webinar. You can access the voting questions from the “**Polls**” tab and then close the window to return to the slides. We will be discussing 3 of them as introduction to the presentations or particular topics to further explore. The last one will be used at the end of the webinar to assess your satisfaction.
- Finally, you will be able to see who else is participating by clicking on the “**People**” tab.

The webinar will be recorded for future viewing and will be made available in the Members Area of the WINS website

E-Voting


1. What type of organisation do you work for?
2. How credible is the threat to rad sources used for gamma irradiation?
3. I believe that security arrangements implemented at gamma irradiators are sufficient and effective



Designing and Implementing Operational Security Measures at Gamma
Irradiation Facilities

*Presented By: David M. Jackson, CIH, Sr. Radiation Safety Manager –
STERIS AST - Americas*

STERIS AST - America




www.steris-ast.com

The Concern Remains Valid

Lost or stolen material will be used maliciously by terrorist groups as an RDD or RED within a populated area



Figure 4: Immediate Effects Due to Americium Bomb in New York City



- Inner Ring:** All people must receive medical supervision
- Middle Ring:** Maximum annual dose for radiation workers exceeded
- Outer Ring:** Area should be evacuated before radiation cloud passes

Target of Concern

Source Racks come in variety of sizes and configurations

Pool Depth: 20-25 ft (6-7.6 m)

Activity:

Source: 11,000ci new (407 TBq)
3000-5000ci avg. (111-185 TBq)

Module: 150kci – 230 kci (5.6–8.5 PBq)

99.9% are Category 1

Self Protecting

Co60 Gamma Constant: 1.3 R/hr/ci at 1m

Time to 1000R (10Sv)

11,000 ci source: 4.2 minutes
200,000 ci Module: 14 seconds



≈ 3.50 Mci (129 PBq)

Global Framework

- International Atomic Energy Agency
 - 8-G - “Preventive and Protective Measures Against Insider Threats”
 - 11-G - “Security of Radioactive Material In Use and Storage and of Associated Facilities”
 - 37-G – “Developing a National Framework for Managing the Response to Nuclear Security Events”
- WINS
 - Also has a number of Documents
 - 1.4 – “Nuclear Security Culture”
 - BPG 5.8 – “Security of Radioactive Sources Used in Industrial Radiation Processing”
- Nation States
 - Could be general or very specific.
 - US NRC

Insider Threat

Insiders have knowledge about;

- Targets
 - Locations, quantities
 - Details about facility
- Security
 - Location and details about the system
 - Details about protocols
- Operations
 - Tools and equipment
 - Processes
 - Materials
 - Alarms and alerts

Insiders;

- Can have Authority over people
 - Designated Authority
 - Personal Influence
- Control or Influence
 - Alarm assessments
 - Sensitive information
 - Procedures and Processes
- Knowledge
 - Tools and equipment location
 - Alarm protocols or overrides

Access Authorization

Background Check

- Verification of Identity
- Local Criminal History
- Character Reference Check

FBI Criminal History Check

- Fingerprints
- Criminal History
- Identification

Trustworthy and Reliability Assessment

for Unescorted Access to the Radioactive Material and Access to Protected Information by Reviewing Official

Job Classifications Requiring T&R

- Operators
- Supervisors
- Maintenance Technicians
- Operations Administrators

Access Control – Security Zones


Define the **Security Zone**

- Continuous Physical Barrier
- Entry thru Access Control Points
- Unescorted access only by T&R individuals
- Maintain direct control
 - Continuous surveillance
 - Intrusion Detection Devices

Establish **Temporary Security Zones** during periods of Maintenance

- Source Receipt and Handling

Coordinate with Local Law Enforcement for a timely armed response



Access Control – Outer Perimeter

- Perimeter Fencing with barbed wire
 - Man gates allow egress only
 - Truck gates are locked after scheduled pickup and delivery hours
 - Truck gates monitored by camera or personnel



Access Control – Middle Perimeter

- Building

- Controlled Access entrance points into the building for Employees, Visitors, and Contractors
- Limited Access points & maintain the access
- Truck drivers should not have access to the building unless escorted




Access Control – Middle/Inner Perimeter

- Building
 - Autodial intrusion alarm system for each designated Security Zone
 - Redundant means of Communication to the Alarm Service Company



Access Control – Middle/Inner Perimeter


- Employee Photo ID Badge
 - Programmable Proximity Badge allows access only through authorized control points
 - Employee Badge always worn in plain site
 - Allows access only to where needed
 - Contractors with an acceptable T&R assessment may also be issued a temporary ID badge
 - Allows access only to where needed
 - Need to be programmed for only the time period needed.



Multi-Layered Approach to Access Control

- Building

- All perimeter doors and critical internal doors and openings are under continuous CCTV surveillance
- System used to verify the validity of any incident
 - Simple B&E or attempt to access RM?
- Remote viewing access (minimum 30 days)




Detection – Inner Perimeter

- **Detect without delay Unauthorized Entry into the Security Zone**
 - Continuous surveillance during normal operations
 - Intrusion Detection Sensors during shutdown periods



Motion Sensor



Floor Sensor Mats



Radiation Monitor



Entry Door Contacts



Glass Break Sensor

Physical Security - Delay

- Pool Covers and Shrouds



Physical Security - Delay

- Stronger Doors and Locks



What You Don't Know

Access to Professional Security Knowledge

- Work closely with your Security Staff
- Work closely with Local Law Enforcement
 - Drills? Tours?
- Government
 - The Office of Radiological Security



STERIS AST - America

Thank You



THREATS

- ❑ How Credible is the Threat?
- ❑ What are possible scenarios of concerns?
- ❑ Can we consider radioactive sources used in gamma irradiators as “self-protected”?

- ❑ Questions from the audience?

PANEL DISCUSSION

- ❑ How does David's presentation resonate to you? What is similar? What is different, especially for smaller organisations?
- ❑ Would you have examples of challenges you faced while strengthening the security of your facilities? Could you share with us how you have solved these challenges?
- ❑ Is it a problem to find suppliers that can meet the particular requirements of gamma irradiator security?
- ❑ Do you feel that regulation of gamma irradiators in your country is clear and appropriate?
- ❑ What would be your top advice to a security manager willing to improve the security of his/her facility?

- ❑ **Questions from the audience?**

Cybersecurity Best Practices

PNNL-SA-155371

September 3, 2020


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Objective




- Provide the background/purpose of ORS and its role in promoting cybersecurity
- Suggest two major best practices with tangible ways to improve cybersecurity at radiological facilities



ORS Background

ORS's mission is to enhance global security by preventing high-activity radioactive materials from being used in acts of terrorism


- **Protect** radioactive sources used for vital medical, research and commercial purposes
- **Remove** and dispose of disused radioactive sources
- **Reduce** the global reliance on high-activity radioactive sources




Radioactive Sources and Cybersecurity

■ The Threat

- The compromise of a site’s network controls and physical security measures, facilitating an attack on radioactive source
- The compromise of a site’s security equipment to gain access to a site’s network
- The use of social engineering to gain access to a site’s physical security systems and networks



Radioactive Sources and Cybersecurity



Reduce the attack surface – Managers

(Strategic/policy level)

1. Defense in depth and layered protection architectures

Concentric layers of security around an asset

2. Principle of least privilege

Access is not afforded to those who do not need it to perform their duties

3. Cyber hygiene practices

Can be defined as the practices or actions taken by owners and users to maintain the health and security of electronic information.

These actions are often routine and help to mitigate data from being lost to nefarious and unintentional loss or corruption



Reduce the attack surface – Employees

(Operational/device level)

1. Defense in depth and layered protection architectures

- Implement network segmentation and isolation
- Full disk encryption

2. Principle of least privilege

- Remove unnecessary software from workstations
- Manage account and resource access levels

3. Cyber hygiene practices

- Keep software up-to-date
- Close excess ports and disable unused protocols on network appliances
- Eliminate complexity whenever possible (e.g., unused, redundant, or duplicate rules)
- Maintain routers, firewalls, and switches appropriately
- Promote vigilance of connectivity (Wi-Fi and Bluetooth) – Bring your own device
- Educate about the risks of external data exchange – EMAILS!
- Continuous effort



Ensure integrity of security-related devices and communications – Managers/Policy

(Strategic/policy level)

1. Account management

Oversight and governance of user credentials. Frequently involves creation of new accounts, modification of existing, and closure of accounts no longer requiring the prescribed level of access

Often enforced through access control models (e.g., role-based, rule based, among others)

2. Authentication processes

Taking steps to reasonably assure that a user identify is valid



Ensure integrity of security-related devices and communications – Employees

(Operational/device level)

1. Account management

- Mitigate privilege escalation
- Enforce password management (utilize strong, unique passphrases)
- Multi-factor authentication (MFA)
- Continuous effort



2. Authentication processes

- Validate integrity of hardware and software during installation and configuration
- Secure access to infrastructure, virtual and physical devices (e.g., protecting admin and physical access via MFA)
- Continuous effort



Summary

Radioactive material licensees can enhance the security of radioactive materials by implementing a balanced approach of physical security and cybersecurity

- The digitalization of physical protection systems has created new attack pathways via networked systems
- All levels of the organization have a role to play in the implementation of a strong security culture
- Even advanced physical security and cybersecurity systems can be thwarted by failing to account for the human element



Thank you for your time!



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CYBERSECURITY

- ❑ Is it your experience that industries using radioactive sources are addressing the cyberthreat sufficiently?
- ❑ What one or two key actions will best protect the radiation processing industry from cyberthreat?
- ❑ Should we expect greater regulation or new standards (e.g. IAEA) in the future?

- ❑ Questions from the audience?

I. RESPONDING TO A SECURITY INCIDENT

II. DEVELOPING A ROBUST SECURITY CULTURE

Poll question



- I believe effective response arrangements are in place in case of a security incident.

Follow up discussion

- What are the key elements of effective response arrangements?
- What are the usual challenges? How can we improve the situation?

Discussion

- Has the gamma irradiation industry developed a robust security culture?
- What are best practices for developing a sustainable security culture?
- How do you engage staff into security matters (awareness and education)?




Joint iia/WINS Best Practice Guide

Security of Radioactive Sources Used in Industrial Radiation Processing

Available at:

www.iaglobal.com - Resources

www.wins.org - Knowledge Centre



Thank you everybody for having joined us here today!

Please use the poll question to let us know if you liked the webinar

If you have any further questions or comments, please

Contact us at info@wins.org or info@iiaglobal.com

Visit us at www.wins.org or www.iiaglobal.com

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THANK YOU FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION !